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CAPITOL RECORDS V. VIMEO:  HOW THE 
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT IS 
OUTDATED AND IN NEED OF REVISION  
Dustin Johnson* 
This Comment analyzes the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in Capitol 
Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).  Beginning with a 
brief overview of the DMCA’s history, this Comment acknowledges the 
Second Circuit’s holding in Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 
(2d Cir. 2012).  In Viacom, the Second Circuit set precedent with its 
interpretation of the knowledge requirements for safe harbor under section 
512(c) of the DMCA. 
In Capitol Records, the Second Circuit confirmed its holding in Viacom 
but missed an opportunity to adequately clarify the knowledge requirements 
under section 512(c) of the DMCA.  The Second Circuit also overturned a 
district court ruling which held that the DMCA did not apply to pre-1972 
sound recordings.  This Comment critiques the Second Circuit’s 
interpretations of the DMCA while exploring the safe harbor provisions of 
section 512(c) and 512(m).  This Comment concludes by providing 
recommendations for updating the DMCA to more effectively protect 
copyright holders by balancing their interests with those of internet service 
providers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Carlos Berdejó, the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review’s staff and 
editors, and his family for making this possible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The days of dial-up internet and America Online are ancient history.  
Technology has rapidly advanced to the point that goods and services are 
exchanged across the globe with the click of a mouse, and love is found with 
the swipe of a finger across an iPhone screen.  Consumers of various types 
of media, including music and video content, have also seen a dramatic 
change from the days of VHS and cassettes to a nearly exclusive online 
market.  However, legislation aimed to protect creative expressions from 
infringement has not advanced beyond the days of dial-up internet.   
Content creators have battled for copyright protection since technology 
made it possible for anyone to copy, print, and disseminate an author’s 
written words.1  The founding fathers recognized the importance of 
protecting creative works and gave Congress the responsibility “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”2  In the wake of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
Copyright Treaty, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) in 1998 “to update domestic copyright law for the digital age.”3  
The DMCA was passed in an effort to modify the law at a time when music 
distribution was changing from compact discs to Mp3s.4  At the time of the 
DMCA’s passage, Congress was concerned that the threat of expensive 
copyright infringement litigation would stifle the speed in which new 
internet companies would make technological advances.5   
The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals interpreted 
the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions in Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 
(“Viacom”) 6 and applied those interpretations in Capitol Records v. Vimeo 
                                                 
1. 1 ROBERT A. GORMAN, ET AL., COPYRIGHT 1 (8th ed., 2011) (“When printing from type 
was invented and works could be reproduced in quantities for circulation, however, it seems that 
the author was without protection as soon as the work got into print.”). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Ellison v. 
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
4. Tatsuya Adachi, Note, Did Vimeo Kill the Radio Star?  DMCA Safe Harbors, Pre-1972 
Sound Recordings & the Future of Digital Music, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 443, 445 (2016). 
5. Id. 
6. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d 19. 
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(“Capitol Records”).7  In Capitol Records, Vimeo, an online video sharing 
website, was sued for copyright infringement for hosting videos containing 
copyright protected sound recordings without the copyright holders’ 
permission.8  The Second Circuit applied its reasoning from Viacom, a 2012 
case involving nearly identical facts.9  However, in both cases, the Second 
Circuit failed to adequately explain and clarify what constitutes actual or 
“red flag” knowledge under the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.10  
Therefore, Congress should update the DMCA to include pre-1972 sound 
recordings in order to reduce costly litigation that negatively impacts both 
content creators and internet service providers.   
This Comment analyzes the DMCA and the Second Circuit’s 
application of the statute in Capitol Records.  Part II discusses the 
background of the DMCA from its inception and details the provisions 
discussed in Capitol Records.  Part III will discuss the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the DMCA as applied in Viacom and Capitol Records.  Part 
IV analyzes and critiques the Second Circuit’s decision.  Part V recommends 
changes to the DMCA that will clarify certain provisions to reduce the 
amount of costly litigation that plagues both copyright holders and internet 
service providers.  Part VI concludes that Congress should update the DMCA 
so that copyright holding creators are afforded similar levels of protection 
that internet service providers currently receive.   
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
In response to the difficulties of protecting against copyright 
infringement in the internet age, Congress passed Title II of the DMCA—
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA)— in 
1998.11  “OCILLA endeavors to facilitate cooperation among internet service 
providers and copyright owners, ‘to detect and deal with copyright 
                                                 
7. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
8. Id. 
9. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d 19. 
10. See id.; Capital Records, 826 F.3d 78. 
11. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.’”12  
Congress passed OCILLA in hopes of resolving questions regarding the 
liabilities of service providers whose networks are used to transmit 
infringing material.13  However, instead of clarifying the numerous copyright 
doctrines, “Congress elected ‘to leave current law in its evolving state and 
. . . create[d] a series of “safe harbors[]” for certain common activities of 
service providers.’”14   
The safe harbors of the DMCA limit the liability of internet service 
providers in copyright infringement claims.15  OCILLA shields internet 
service providers from liability for copyright infringement claims resulting 
from: (1) “transitory digital network communications”;16 (2) “system 
caching”;17 (3) “information residing on systems or networks at direction of 
users”;18 and (4) “information location tools.”19 
Only “service providers” may qualify for safe harbor protection.20  
Once deemed a service provider, a party must also satisfy certain conditions 
for safe harbor eligibility.21  These conditions include the adoption and 
reasonable implementation of a policy that terminates subscribers and 
                                                 
12. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 
(1998)). 
13. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 105-190 at 2). 
14. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 19 (emphasis added)). 
15. Id.; see also Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076. 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2018). 
17. Id. § 512(b). 
18. Id. § 512(c). 
19. Id. § 512(d). 
20. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 27 (defining a service provider as “[a] provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
512(k)(1)(B)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (defining a service provider as “an entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing or connections for digital online communications, between 
or among points specified by user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the 
content of the material as sent or received.”). 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 
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account holders deemed repeat infringers.22  Furthermore, a service provider 
seeking safe harbor protection must allow copyright owners to employ 
certain measures to identify and protect their works.23  
In addition to the threshold criteria, each specific safe harbor has 
certain requirements.24  This Comment mainly focuses on the safe harbors 
afforded by section 512(c) and—to a lesser extent—section 512(m).25  
Section 512(c)’s safe harbor protection will apply only if the service 
provider: (1) does not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing;26 
(2) is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent;27 (3) acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the 
infringing material after acquiring actual knowledge;28 and (4) does not 
receive financial benefit from the infringing activity where the service 
provider has the right and ability to control such activity.29 
The DMCA requires a service provider to adopt, implement, and 
inform its users of its policy to terminate repeat infringers.30  However, under 
section 512(m), the DMCA explicitly removes any responsibility from the 
service provider to proactively police its network for infringing content.31  
Consequently, these safe harbor provisions unfairly bias copyright-holders 
                                                 
22. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
23. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 27 (explaining and quoting the conditions set forth in 17 
U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2)). 
24. Id. 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary . . . 
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for 
the service provider . . . .”); Id. § 512(m). 
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
27. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
28. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
29. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
30. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
31. Id. § 512(m)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the 
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or 
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity . . . .”). 
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by making it nearly impossible for them to prevail against internet service 
providers on copyright infringement claims. 
III. INTERPRETING THE DMCA: CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V. VIMEO, LLC 
Prior to hearing the appeal from Capitol Records, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit interpreted the DMCA in Viacom.32  This Part will 
discuss the opinion rendered by the Second Circuit in Viacom and how that 
interpretation of the DMCA was applied in Capitol Records.  
A.  Prelude to Capitol Records: Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 
Before Capitol Records, the Second Circuit addressed the DMCA’s 
safe harbor protections in Viacom.33  In Viacom, a group of plaintiffs—
including Viacom, various Viacom affiliates, and the Premier League (an 
English soccer league)—filed a putative class action against YouTube for 
copyright infringement “on behalf of all copyright owners whose material 
was copied, stored, displayed, or performed on YouTube without 
authorization.”34  In total, Viacom identified 63,497 video clips allegedly 
containing infringing content while Premier League produced 13,500 clips 
on behalf of the putative class.35 
1.  The District Court’s Holding 
Prior to trial, both parties moved for summary judgment based on the 
applicability of the DMCA’s safe harbor protections.36  The district court 
determined that a jury could decide whether YouTube had a general 
awareness of copyright infringing material posted on its website and whether 
it possibly even encouraged users to post such content.37  However, after 
analyzing the statutory language of the DMCA regarding actual and apparent 
red flag knowledge, the court held, “[m]ere knowledge of [the] prevalence 
                                                 
32. See generally Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
33. See generally id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 28–29. 
36. Id. at 29. 
37. Id. 
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of such activity in general is not enough [to constitute knowledge].”38  
Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
YouTube.39 
2.  Viacom in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
interpretation of DMCA section 512(c)(1)(A), which held that both actual 
and red flag knowledge “refer to ‘knowledge of specific and identifiable 
infringements.’”40  After examining plaintiffs’ evidence as to YouTube’s 
alleged knowledge, the Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s holding and 
remanded the case back to the district court to determine if the evidence (e-
mails between YouTube employees) constituted actual knowledge.41  
Furthermore, the court held that in order to survive defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on remand, plaintiffs had to show that those emails 
specifically referenced the video clips at issue.42 
Additionally, plaintiffs argued that YouTube was “willfully blind” to 
specific instances of infringement and, therefore, should be disqualified from 
safe harbor protection.43  The court defined willful blindness to mean “where 
the person ‘was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and 
consciously avoided confirming that fact.’”44  The court held that the willful 
blindness doctrine could be applied to demonstrate knowledge or awareness 
of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.45  The Second Circuit 
held on remand that, the district court must consider whether the defendant 
made a “deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge” in order to determine 
                                                 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 41. 
40. Id. at 30. 
41. Id. at 32–34. 
42. Id. at 34. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
45. Id. 
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whether YouTube qualifies for safe harbor protection.46  The court’s 
interpretation of the DMCA’s knowledge requirements is echoed in Capitol 
Records.47  
B.  Capitol Records v. Vimeo in the District Court 
1.  District Court Procedure 
Prior to reaching the Second Circuit, the parties involved in Capitol 
Records twice argued in front of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.48  In the first proceeding, Capitol Records, 
Virgin Records, and various subsidiaries of EMI Music (“Plaintiffs”) 
brought claims of copyright infringement against Vimeo, a company which 
provided an online platform for users to post and share videos with the 
public.49  The suit, filed on December 10, 2009, alleged copyright 
infringement involving 199 user-created videos containing sound recordings 
to which Plaintiffs owned the rights to.50   
In September 2012, Vimeo filed a motion for summary judgment based 
on the safe harbor defense afforded to service providers by the DMCA.51  
Plaintiffs countered by filing a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, 
alleging that Vimeo was ineligible for safe harbor protection.52   
2.  The District Court’s Summary Judgment Analysis 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
granted Vimeo’s motion for summary judgment for 144 of the 199 videos, 
                                                 
46. Id. (citation omitted). 
47. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC (Capitol Records I), 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 523 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), amended on reconsideration in part, Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC 
(Capitol Records II) , 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
48. Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500. 
49. See Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 504. 
50. Id. at 506–507. 
51. Id. at 507. 
52. Id. 
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holding that the DMCA’s safe harbor protections applied to those videos.53  
The court found, however, that there was a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Vimeo had knowledge or awareness regarding the fifty-five 
remaining videos.54  Plaintiffs’ evidence showed that Vimeo employees 
interacted, at some point, with the remaining fifty-five videos through 
various features of Vimeo’s website.55  While the court was unwilling to 
declare such interactions as actual knowledge of infringement, it did, 
however, hold that triable issues remained as to whether such interactions 
constituted actual or red flag knowledge of infringement.56 
Additionally, the district court granted summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs for any videos containing sound recordings that were made prior 
to February 15, 1972.57  The court based its ruling on section 301(c) of the 
Copyright Act.58  Section 301(c) states: “With respect to sound recordings 
fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common 
law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until 
February 15, 2067.”59  The court concluded that the statutory language of the 
Act, along with a December 2011 report by the Copyright Office, indicated 
that it was Congress’ responsibility, rather than the court’s, to extend the 
Copyright Act to pre-1972 sound recordings if it so desired.60  As a result, 
the court denied safe harbor protection to Vimeo for any of the 199 videos 
containing sound recordings made before February 15, 1972.61 
                                                 
53. Id. at 537. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 522. 
56. Id. at 523. 
57. Id. at 537. 
58. Id. at 536. 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2018). 
60. Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37 (referring to “Copyright Office Report”); 
see also Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
(Dec. 2011), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VM8-
GSZP]. 
61. Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37. 
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3.  Post-Summary Judgment Motions by Capitol Records and Vimeo 
After the Southern District of New York’s ruling, Vimeo moved for 
reconsideration and certification for interlocutory appeal, and Plaintiffs 
moved for leave to file amended complaints.62  The court granted Vimeo’s 
motion for reconsideration, and in a new proceeding, granted its motion for 
summary judgment for seventeen additional videos while denying summary 
judgment for the remaining thirty-seven.63  Regarding the seventeen 
additional videos, the court found insufficient evidence to support the 
allegation that Vimeo’s employees ever viewed fifteen out of the 
seventeen.64  Furthermore, the court posited that the sound recordings in the 
two remaining videos were so short—thirty-eight and fifty-seven seconds 
during the middle of the videos in question—that the infringing nature was 
not objectively obvious.65 
Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend the complaint to add 1,476 new 
instances of infringement: one quarter of which were videos containing pre-
1972 sound recordings and approximately one-third of which were subject 
to interaction by Vimeo employees.66  Despite Vimeo’s objections, the court 
held that Plaintiffs satisfied all necessary requirements under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) and granted leave to amend the complaint to 
include the additional videos.67 
4.  Questions for Interlocutory Appeal 
Vimeo asked the court to certify two questions for interlocutory appeal:  
(1) Are the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions applicable to sound 
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972?  (2) Does a service 
provider’s mere viewing of a user-generated video containing 
third-party copyrighted music automatically give rise to a triable 
                                                 
62. Capitol Records II, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
63. Id. at 541. 
64. Id. at 544–45. 
65. Id. at 546 (applying the standard for ‘red flag’ knowledge set forth in Viacom Int’l, Inc. 
v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
66. Id. at 549. 
67. Id. at 549–50. 
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issue of fact as to the service provider’s knowledge of 
infringement under the DMCA?68 
Plaintiffs did not offer any opposition but requested that the court certify 
“whether Vimeo had the ‘right and ability to control’ infringing activity, 
whether [Vimeo] acted with ‘willful blindness’ to infringement, and whether 
[Vimeo] had instituted a repeat infringer policy.”69  The court discussed and 
denied all of Plaintiffs’ requests.70  
The court modified Vimeo’s second question, determining that a more 
appropriate question was, “whether, under Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 
Inc., a service provider’s viewing of a user-generated video containing all or 
virtually all of a recognizable, copyrighted song may establish ‘facts or 
circumstances’ giving rise to ‘red flag’ knowledge of infringement.”71  
C.  The Second Circuit’s Opinion 
1.  Summary of District Court’s Opinion 
In the opening of the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Leval briefly 
summarized the proceedings leading up to this decision.72  Judge Leval 
discussed that: (1) the district court held that any of the 199 videos-in-suit 
posted on Vimeo’s website containing pre-1972 sound recordings were not 
subject to safe harbor protection;73 (2) the district court granted Vimeo’s 
motion for summary judgment for 153 videos because of a lack of proof that 
Vimeo employees had viewed them;74  (3) the district court rejected 
Plaintiffs’ argument alleging that Vimeo’s general policy of willful blindness 
towards infringement on its website constituted actual or red flag 
                                                 
68. Id. at 550. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 554–56. 
71. Id. at 553. 
72. Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 81–82. 
73. Id. at 81. 
74. Id. 
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knowledge;75 and (4) as to the remaining videos discussed above, the district 
court denied each party’s motion for summary judgment, holding that there 
were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Vimeo had red flag 
knowledge of infringement, which would disqualify it from safe harbor 
protection.76  
2.  Issues to Be Decided via Interlocutory Appeal 
In addition to the two questions for interlocutory appeal, the Second 
Circuit answered an additional issue brought forth by Plaintiffs: “whether 
Plaintiffs have shown that Vimeo had a general policy of willful blindness 
to infringement of sound recordings, which would justify imputing to Vimeo 
knowledge of the specific infringements.”77 
The Second Circuit held: (1) the DMCA’s safe harbor protection does 
apply to pre-1972 sound recordings; (2) under the standard set forth in 
Viacom, some viewing by a service provider’s employee of a video that plays 
all, or virtually all, of a recognizable song is not sufficient to establish red 
flag knowledge; and (3) the district court was correct in rejecting Plaintiffs’ 
argument that Vimeo’s alleged general policy of willful blindness 
disqualified it from DMCA’s safe harbor protection.78 
3.  Pre-1972 Sound Recordings 
The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in its ruling that the 
DMCA did not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings.79  The district court, 
along with the Federal Copyright Office, determined that section 301(c) of 
the Federal Copyright Act kept pre-1972 sound recordings under state law 
protection until they passed into the public domain on February 15, 2067.80  
With that interpretation in mind, Plaintiffs successfully persuaded the district 
                                                 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 82. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (emphasis added). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 87–88. 
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court that in order to abide by section 301(c) of the Copyright Act, the 
DMCA could not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings.81 
After a dense and complicated discussion of the statutory language and 
interpretation by the district court and the Copyright Office, the Second 
Circuit concluded that both the district court and the Federal Copyright 
Office misread section 512(c).82  The Second Circuit held that Congress’ 
purpose in passing the DMCA is defeated if interpretation of section 512(c) 
leaves service providers liable to state-law copyright infringement claims for 
infringements of which those service providers were unaware.83  Under the 
district court’s interpretation, a service provider would incur heavy costs in 
order to monitor its websites for infringements involving pre-1972 
recordings or it would otherwise incur potentially high state law penalties.84  
Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that forcing service providers to 
monitor their websites for pre-1972 recordings would conflict with section 
512(m), which specifically excuses an internet service provider from such 
proactive screening.85  With this opposing interpretation of the DMCA in 
mind, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s granting of summary 
judgment to Plaintiffs for all of the videos-in-suit containing pre-1972 sound 
recordings.86   
4.  Red Flag Knowledge of Infringement 
The Second Circuit went on to answer the second certified question, 
“[w]hether . . . a service provider’s viewing of a user-generated video 
containing all or virtually all of a recognizable, copyrighted song may 
establish facts and circumstances giving rise to red flag knowledge of 
                                                 
81. Id. at 88 (“[T]hat the interrelationship of § 301(c) with the safe harbor provision of § 
512(c) requires that the latter be interpreted to have no application to pre-1972 sound recordings 
. . . if this safe harbor provision is interpreted to protect service providers from infringement 
liability under state copyright laws [due to preemption], it conflicts irreconcilably with § 301(c)’s 
provision that, until 2067, ‘rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall 
not be annulled or limited by this title.’”). 
82. Id. at 89. 
83. Id. at 90. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 92. 
86. Id. at 93. 
JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/29/2018  1:05 AM 
168 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2 
infringement.”87  This question arose out of the district court’s denial of 
summary judgment in favor of Vimeo in regard to a number of videos-in-
suit that Plaintiffs alleged Vimeo employees viewed.88  On one hand the 
district court held that triable issues of fact remained regarding those videos-
in-suit and whether Vimeo employees had gained red flag knowledge of 
infringement by viewing them.89  On the other hand, the Second Circuit held 
that Plaintiffs provided insufficient facts to prove red flag knowledge, and 
vacated the district court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of Vimeo.90 
In Viacom, the Second Circuit held: 
The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . not 
between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between 
a subjective and objective standard.  In other words, the actual 
knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or 
subjectively knew of specific infringement, while the red flag 
provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware 
of facts that would have made the specific infringement 
objectively obvious to a reasonable person.91 
This reasonable person is someone without specialized knowledge or 
expertise in music or copyright laws.92  Using the obvious reasonable person 
standard, the court held that a Vimeo employee merely viewing a video 
containing all, or virtually all, of a copyrighted, recognizable song would be 
insufficient.93  The Second Circuit, in explaining its reasoning for vacating 
the district court’s order, discussed the burden of proof necessary to prove 
red flag knowledge allegations.94 
                                                 
87. Id. at 93. 
88. Id. 
89. Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
90. Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 93. 
91. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 31 (emphasis added). 
92. Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 93–94. 
93. Id. at 94. 
94. Id. at 94–98. 
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Because safe harbor protection is an affirmative defense, a defendant 
raising this defense bears the burden of establishing both service provider 
status and the fulfillment of the required steps for eligibility.95  However, the 
burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff when attempting to disqualify a 
defendant from safe harbor protection either by failure to abide by statutory 
requirements or by having actual or red flag knowledge.96  The Second 
Circuit noted that expecting a defendant service provider to prove that none 
of its employees had either actual or red flag knowledge is unreasonable and 
would defeat the purpose of safe harbor defenses.97 
In assessing the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ attempt to disqualify Vimeo 
from safe harbor protection, the Second Circuit held that simply showing 
that a Vimeo employee viewed a video containing all or most of a 
recognizable copyrighted song was not enough to sustain the Plaintiffs’ 
burden.98  The court provided several reasons for this determination.99  First, 
Plaintiffs provided no evidence of how long the video was viewed.100  The 
court noted that an employee commenting on a posted video was not 
sufficient evidence to establish that the employee knew the video contained 
an entire piece of copyright-protected music.101  Second, there are many 
different purposes for why an employee may have viewed the video in 
question, many of which may have nothing to do with music recognition.102  
Moreover, a song—or a portion of a song—that is recognizable to one person 
may be entirely unrecognizable to another.103 
                                                 
95. Id. at 94. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 96. 
99. Id. at 96–97. 
100. Id. at 96. 
101. Id. (“The fact that an employee viewed enough of a video to post a brief comment . . . 
would not show that she had ascertained that its audio track contains all or virtually all of a piece 
of music.”). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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Additionally, the court expressed that it would be unfair to presume 
that service providers’ employees are experts in copyright law.104  Generally 
speaking, service providers’ employees cannot be expected to know the 
difference between infringement and fair use, whether the user has acquired 
authorization, or if a certain song is licensed.105  The court recognized that in 
some instances, service providers’ employees may have the requisite 
knowledge to make such determinations.106  However, the burden of proof 
to establish such knowledge lies with the Plaintiffs who, in this case, 
provided no such evidence.107 
Plaintiffs argued that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of what 
constitutes red flag knowledge is nearly identical to what constitutes actual 
knowledge.108  In response, the court stated that although there is not a vast 
difference between red flag and actual knowledge of infringement, there is a 
real difference.109  Plaintiffs also argued that this slight delineation between 
the two reduces red flag knowledge to a nearly obsolete category.110  The 
court replied that Congress’ decision to include red flag knowledge as a bar 
to protection does not necessarily mean that it intended red flag knowledge 
to be easily attainable.111   
Ultimately, the court vacated the district court’s denial of summary 
judgment and remanded for further consideration.112  The court held that 
summary judgment should be granted in favor of Vimeo unless Plaintiffs 
could prove that Vimeo personnel had red flag or actual knowledge of 
infringement.113 
                                                 
104. Id. at 96–97. 
105. Id. at 97. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 96. 
111. Id. at 97. 
112. Id. at 97–98. 
113. Id. 
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5.  Willful Blindness 
The final issue addressed by the Second Circuit pertained to Plaintiffs’ 
assertion that the district court misapplied the doctrine of willful blindness 
outlined previously in Viacom.114  In Viacom, the Second Circuit held that a 
plaintiff can use willful blindness to establish a defendant’s knowledge of 
infringement under the DMCA.115   
Here, Plaintiffs made three arguments to show that Vimeo 
demonstrated willful blindness: (1) Vimeo monitored its users’ content for 
video infringement but not audio infringement;116 (2) Vimeo failed to 
investigate possible infringements even though it was aware of facts 
suggesting that infringement was likely;117 and (3) Vimeo encouraged users 
to post infringing content and then turned a blind eye to resulting 
infringements.118  The Second Circuit rejected the first argument based on 
section 512(m) of the DMCA, which excuses the service provider from 
policing its website for infringing content.119  The fact that Vimeo voluntarily 
monitored its website for infringing video does not mean that it is required 
to monitor for infringing audio.120 
Similarly, the Second Circuit applied section 512(m) of the DMCA to 
reject Plaintiffs’ second argument.121  The court acknowledged that section 
512(c) provides consequences when a service provider has actual knowledge 
of infringement or becomes aware of facts and circumstances that would 
make infringement obvious (harking back to the confusing objective versus 
                                                 
114. Id. at 98. 
115. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 35 (“[T]he willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in 
appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of 
infringement under the DMCA.”). 
116. Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 98. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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subjective analysis).122  However, the court noted that the facts and 
circumstances in the present case did not amount to more than suspicion, and 
based on the court’s interpretation of section 512(m),123 suspicion is not 
enough to create a duty to investigate further.124  The court also noted that 
Congress’ intention, when passing the DMCA, was to protect service 
providers from heavy expenses and liabilities to copyright owners.125  Thus, 
the Second Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ second argument.126 
Plaintiffs’ third argument concerned Vimeo’s alleged general policy of 
willful blindness to infringement.127  Based on its opinion in Viacom, the 
Second Circuit acknowledged that willful blindness can constitute 
knowledge of infringement.128  However, such willful blindness must 
correlate to specific instances of infringement.129  Although Plaintiffs 
provided evidence of Vimeo employees ignoring and sometimes 
encouraging users to post infringing content, those encouragements did not 
encompass any of the 199 videos involved in this lawsuit.130  Moreover, the 
few documented instances of Vimeo employees encouraging the posting of 
infringing videos were not enough evidence to support Plaintiffs’ allegation 
that Vimeo employed a general policy of encouraging infringement.131  
Absent evidence of specific instances that Vimeo employees encouraged 
                                                 
122. Id. 
123. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2018) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition 
the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on – (1) a service provider monitoring its service or 
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a 
standard technical measure.”). 
124. Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 98–99. 
125. Id. at 98. 
126. Id. at 98–99. 
127. Id. at 99. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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users to post known infringing content in the videos at issue, the court held 
that Vimeo was entitled to safe harbor protection.132 
In sum, the Second Circuit held that: (1) the DMCA’s safe harbor 
protection applies to pre-1972 sound recordings; (2) the district court erred 
in denying Vimeo’s motion for summary judgment in regard to videos 
allegedly viewed by its employees; and (3) the district court correctly ruled 
in Vimeo’s favor as to Plaintiffs’ willful blindness accusation.133  
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
In Capitol Records, the Second Circuit broke new ground in holding 
that the DMCA’s safe harbors apply to pre-1972 recordings.134  The court 
also confirmed its interpretation of the DMCA established in Viacom 
regarding the application of actual or red flag knowledge to internet service 
providers.135  However, the court failed to adequately clarify the difference 
between actual and red flag knowledge under the DMCA.136  Although the 
Second Circuit correctly applied the law to the facts according to the DMCA, 
the lack of clarification as to the difference between actual and red flag 
knowledge will likely result in further litigation.  This result will have a 
negative impact on content creators and internet service providers alike.  
A.  Pre-1972 Recordings 
Prior to the Second Circuit’s reversal, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the DMCA’s safe harbor protections 
did not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings.137  Influenced by the New York 
Appellate Division’s holding in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media 
                                                 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016) (reversing 
Capitol Records II, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and distinguishing from UMG Recs., Inc. 
v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2013)). 
135. See generally Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
136. See generally Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 99. 
137. See Capitol Records I, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), amended on 
reconsideration in part, Capitol Records II, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded, Capitol Records, 826 F.3d 78. 
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Grp., Inc, along with a report produced by the United States Copyright 
Office, the district court reasoned that Congress should decide whether the 
DMCA’s safe harbors apply to pre-1972 sound recordings.138  In reversing 
the district court’s ruling, the Second Circuit not only disregarded the 
opinion of the United States Copyright Office but also took on the 
complicated task of deciphering Congressional intent.139  Without an 
amendment to the DMCA, it is foreseeable that courts will have differing 
interpretations regarding the applicability of the DMCA to pre-1972 
recordings, resulting in costly litigation and lengthy appeals.  Furthermore, 
amending and federalizing the DMCA would allow libraries and other 
preservationists to preserve and provide digitalized, historical sound 
recordings to the public without fear of being exposed to costly copyright 
litigation.140   
Opponents of modifying the DMCA include broadcasters and 
publishers who argue that the federal protection of pre-1972 sound 
recordings will force them to either pay expensive licensing fees or not play 
those recordings at all.141  These new expenses could require a complete 
overhaul of the business practices of certain broadcasting and publishing 
companies.142  However, companies in the ever-evolving global economy 
must make the necessary changes to adapt or fall prey to those companies 
who are able to do so.  
Even though the Second Circuit set precedent in its jurisdiction by 
holding that the DMCA applied to pre-1972 sound recordings,143 the statute 
itself needs to be amended to prevent varying interpretations of the DMCA 
                                                 
138. Id. 
139. See Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 87–99. 
140. Andrew M. Pinchin, Comment, Casting Common Law and the Music Industry Adrift: 
Pre-1972 Recordings Enter Federal Safe Harbors, 91 OR. L. REV. 635, 668 (2012); see also P. 
Dylan Jensen, Note, The Pre-1972 Sound Recording Landscape: A Need for a Uniform Federal 
Copyright Scheme, 38 HASTINGS COMM. 7 ENT. L.J. 273, 286 (2016). 
141. Avonne Bell, Federalization of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: A Debate About 
Uncertainty and Public Access, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (June 22, 2011), http://
www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/federalization-pre-1972-sound-recordings-deba 
[https://perma.cc/7JVC-RVWJ]; see also Jensen, supra note 140, at 286.  
142. Bell, supra note 141; see also Jensen, supra note 140, at 286–87. 
143. See Capitol Records, 826 F.3d 78 (reversing Capitol Records II, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537 
and distinguishing from UMG Recs., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106). 
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from court to court.  This could create circuit splits, leading to increased 
litigation and ultimately require the Supreme Court to render a final opinion.  
One simple solution is to have Congress update the DMCA language to 
include pre-1972 sound recordings. 
B.  Actual and Red Flag Knowledge Standards Lack Clarity 
In both Viacom and Capitol Records, the Second Circuit held that an 
internet service provider is disqualified from safe harbor protection only 
when it has actual or red flag knowledge of specific acts of infringement.144  
This is why the court did not disqualify Vimeo from safe harbor protection 
even though emails existed between Vimeo employees and subscribers 
acknowledging that copyrighted content was being uploaded to Vimeo’s 
website without the rights holders’ permission.145   
Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that 
Vimeo’s actions, or lack thereof, constituted willful blindness.146  The 
Supreme Court held, that “a willfully blind defendant is one who takes 
deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and 
who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.”147  The 
Court’s definition of willful blindness and the confusing distinction between 
actual and red flag knowledge outlined by the Second Circuit in Viacom and 
affirmed in Capitol Records makes it nearly impossible to disqualify a 
service provider from safe harbor.  
The narrowness in which courts have applied the knowledge 
standard encourages service provider employees . . . to keep 
[user-generated content] at arm’s length and never inspect it 
closely. . . . [S]uch requirements encourage business owners of 
video sharing services to employ a bare minimum number of staff 
                                                 
144. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 26; Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 95. 
145. See Capital Records, 826 F.3d at 85, 97. 
146. Id. at 98. 
147. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (adopting 
the willful blindness doctrine in the context of induced patent infringement). 
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so that the service’s chance of exposure to [user generated 
content] is significantly reduced.148 
A service provider can protect itself from liability as long as it can 
prevent its employees from becoming aware of specific instances of 
copyright infringement.149  Thus, a service provider’s general awareness of 
infringement on its website is not enough to disqualify it from safe harbor.150  
This may all but directly encourage a system of “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
amongst service providers regarding the content on their websites.  
The DMCA was fashioned to achieve a balance between content 
creators and internet service providers, yet it seems to have complicated the 
issue.  Copyright holders are expected to police the internet and send DMCA 
compliant takedown notices to service providers, or else their chances for 
prevailing in an infringement suit are nil.151  Conversely, internet service 
providers live in fear of expensive litigation that can lead to bankruptcy even 
after a win in court.152  To add further confusion, the Second Circuit provided 
a wordy and ineffective explanation as to what constitutes the difference 
between actual and red flag knowledge.153  Without clarification of the 
difference between the two types of knowledge, both content creators and 
internet service providers are going to continue to spend millions of dollars 
                                                 
148. Tong Xu, Note, The Future of Online User-Generated Content in the Video Sharing 
Business: Capitol Records LLC v. Vimeo LLC, 17 TUL. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 375, 385 (2013). 
149. See id. 
150. Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory 
Under § 512(C)’s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 85, 129 (2013) (quoting Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 
2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004)). 
151. Id. at 130; see also S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45 (1998); 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) 
(2018) (“[A] notification from a copyright owner or from a person authorized to act on behalf of 
the copyright owner that fails to comply substantially with the provisions in subparagraph (A) shall 
not be considered under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual 
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”). 
152. Tatsuya Adachi, Note, Did Vimeo Kill the Radio Star?  DMCA Safe Harbors, Pre-
1972 Sound Recordings & the Future of Digital Music, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 443, 447 
(2016). 
153. Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 31 (holding that “the actual knowledge provision turns on 
whether the provider actually or subjectively knew of specific infringement, while the red flag 
provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the 
specific infringement objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”). 
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trying to prove whether the provider is disqualified from safe harbor 
protection for having knowledge of infringement and failing to remove the 
content.154  
Perhaps, in addition to codifying the DMCA’s application to pre-1972 
sound recordings, Congress can build clearer instructions into the DMCA 
itself to avoid further litigation in courtrooms across the country.  
C.  Additional Considerations Regarding the DMCA 
1.  What is Streaming? 
In addition to the issues discussed above, the DMCA is ill-equipped to 
regulate the problems associated with music and video streaming.155  
Streaming refers to a user’s ability to immediately listen to or watch content 
via the internet in real time.156  Media content can be played immediately 
without having to store it to a hard drive, like a traditional Mp3 download.157  
Music streaming services like Spotify have attracted 24 million users and “6 
million paying subscribers” since 2013, while YouTube, which streams 
music and video content, attracts over 1 billion users each month.158  Both 
                                                 
154. Erick Shonfeld, Google Spent $100 Million Defending Against Viacom’s $1 Billion 
Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/07/15/-google-viacom-100-
million-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/FGN9-DVKZ]; see also Sirichit, supra note 150, at 144 n.406 
(“Google is reported to have paid over $100 million in legal fees to defend itself against Viacom.”). 
155. See Mike A. Ortega, Note, Paddling Against the Current: Why the DMCA’s Safe 
Harbor Provision is Ineffective Against Music Stream-Ripping, 11 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 60, 64 
(2014) (arguing “that the preventative measures and strict safe harbor provision regulations do 
nothing more than provide a number of hurdles and chilling deterrents for copyright owners to jump 
over, and that the burden of regulating infringing copyright content on service provider’s services 
needs to be shifted back to service providers.”). 
156. Id. at 86; see also Streaming  Media,  STREAMINGMEDIA.COM, http:// 
streamingmedia.com/Glossary/Terms/Streaming+media [https://perma.cc/MHR2-C3J3]. 
157. Ortega, supra note 155, at 86; see also Definition: Streaming Media, WHATIS.COM, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/streaming-media [https://perma.cc/BPA6-MPUC]; 
Streaming Media, supra note 156. 
158. Ortega, supra note 155, at 87–88; see also YouTube for Press, YOUTUBE, https://
www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/ [https://perma.cc/SZ89-DPFC]. 
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Spotify and YouTube pay rights holders159 “through per-stream, ad-
supported fees generated by free plays from consumers.”160 
2.  The Rise of Stream-ripping 
Consumers flock to streaming services like Spotify and YouTube 
because of the ease with which one can consume content.  However, that 
ease also attracts consumers with subversive motives such as stream-
ripping.161  “Stream-ripping is the process of using a program to save 
streaming media in the form of a file so that it is accessed locally.”162  
Consumers can simply copy the URL link attached to the desired streaming 
media and paste it into a program that converts it into an Mp3 file.163  The 
Mp3 file can then be stored on the consumer’s hard drive.164  Music 
streaming services such as Spotify are victims to similar programs whereby 
users can convert a copyrighted song to an Mp3 and store it on their personal 
hard drive.165 
3.  How the DMCA Fails to Protect Against Stream-ripping 
Stream-ripping allows paying subscribers of music streaming services 
to illegally download and share music with people who are not paying for 
                                                 
159. See Ortega, supra note 155, at 88 (“‘Rights holders’ generally includes labels, 
publishers, distributors, and through certain digital distributors, independent artists themselves.”). 
160. Id.; John Maples, YouTube’s Parity Problem, or Why a Billion Isn’t That Impressive, 
BILLBOARD (Mar. 4, 2014, 11:58 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-
mobile/5923137/youtubes-parity-problem-or-why-a-billion-isnt-that  [https://perma.cc/PNB8-
5ES4]. 
161. See Ortega, supra note 155, at 88–89; Jason Koebler, RIAA: YouTube Audio Rippers 
Are New Pirating Threat, U.S. NEWS (June 22, 2012, 1:38 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/06/22/riaa-youtube-audio-rippers-are-new-pirating-threat [https://perma.cc/VRB9-
DNDH]. 
162. Ortega, supra note 155, at 88 (quoting Definition: Streaming Media, supra note 157). 
163. Ortega, supra note 155, at 90. 
164. Id. at 89. 
165. Id. at 91. 
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the music.166  As a result, rights holders are deprived of their royalties.167  
Consider an artist that has tens of millions of monthly listeners on Spotify.  
If just a small fraction of those listeners illegally “ripped” a song and sent 
copies to multiple people, the results would affect revenues for the rights 
holder, publisher, artist, and Spotify itself.  Lost revenue from streaming 
services may not profoundly affect a mega-star, but it could seriously 
undermine the career of a small, independent artist who relies on every 
revenue source. 
Copyright infringement via stream-ripping also affects audio/video 
streaming websites like YouTube.168  Consider a scenario in which an 
unauthorized and unreleased song from a popular artist is uploaded to 
YouTube.169  Users could stream-rip the song from YouTube and save it to 
their personal computers.  In another scenario, that same unreleased song 
could be added to a video and uploaded to YouTube.170  Any YouTube user 
with a stream-ripping program such as “YouTube-MP3” could stream-rip 
and save the unreleased song and video to their hard drive.171  The users—in 
both scenarios—could then further propagate the infringed content by 
uploading it onto other streaming services or social media sites.172  This 
process of “sharing” the infringed material can be continued with each new 
user, spreading it like wildfire across the internet. 
These scenarios illustrate fundamental inadequacies of the DMCA.  
Under section 512(m), the internet service provider (YouTube) has no duty 
to police its website for infringing content.173  Furthermore, if the internet 
service provider does not have actual or red flag knowledge that the song (a) 
                                                 
166. See id. at 92; Koebler, supra note 161. 
167. See Ortega, supra note 155, at 92. 
168. Id. at 90. 
169. See id. at 92. 
170. See id. 
171. Id. at 93–94. 
172. See id. at 92–94. 
173. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the 
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on – (1) a service provider monitoring its service or 
affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a 
standard technical measure . . . .”). 
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is a copyright protected work and (b) is shared without permission on its 
website, then the service provider is protected from any liability.174  
Perhaps the artist or an affiliate becomes aware that the unreleased song 
and video are on YouTube.  Based on the DMCA, the artist or affiliate must 
comply with specific statutory requirements when notifying a YouTube 
agent about the unauthorized song and the resulting infringement.175  If the 
notification does not substantially comply with the statute, it will not 
constitute actual or red flag knowledge.176  Upon receiving a notification of 
infringement in compliance with the DMCA, YouTube must immediately 
remove the video or potentially face copyright infringement claims by the 
artist.177  The YouTube subscriber responsible for posting the unauthorized 
song is then allowed to file a counter-notification under the DMCA.178  If 
that counter-notification complies with the DMCA, YouTube must re-post 
the audio/video file within 10-14  business days unless the copyright holder 
obtains a court order prohibiting such action.179  In this hypothetical, the 
section 512 safe harbors of the DMCA shield YouTube from any copyright 
infringement action filed on the artist’s behalf.   
                                                 
174. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii). 
175. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (“To be effective under this subsection, a notification of 
claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a 
service provider that includes substantially the following: (i) A physical or electronic signature of 
a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed; 
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple 
copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list 
of such works at that site; (iii) Identification of the copyrighted material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is 
to be disables, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the 
material; (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the 
complaining party . . . . ; (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the 
use of the material in the manner companied of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, 
or the law; (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty 
of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive 
right that is allegedly infringed.”). 
176. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i). 
177. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
178. Ortega, supra note 155, at 95; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3). 
179. Ortega, supra note 155, at 95; see also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: 
U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 1, 12 (1998) (available at http://
www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf) [https://perma.cc/6BTV-MVRA]. 
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4.  The Consequences of Stream-ripping 
Section 512(m) of DMCA slights copyright holders by relieving 
service providers of the onus and incentive to adequately police their 
websites for infringing content and places that burden on the copyright 
holders.180  Furthermore, subscribers who are caught posting infringing 
content on those websites may, at worst, have their subscriptions revoked.  
Thus, those who wish to post illicit content are all but encouraged to do so.  
Meanwhile, there is little if any recourse for the lost time, effort, and 
potential revenue that the artist suffers as a result of the infringement.  There 
must be some middle ground and an incentive for wealthy companies like 
YouTube (owned by Google, LLC)181 and, to a lesser extent, Vimeo,182 to 
balance their financial interests with the interests of content creators.  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Below, this Comment recaps and discusses the following 
recommendations: (1) Congress should amend the DMCA to specifically 
include pre-1972 recordings; (2) Congress should clarify the standards for 
what constitutes actual or red flag knowledge under section 512(c) and apply 
those standards nationwide to prevent further confusion; and (3) Congress 
should remove or modify section 512(m) of the DMCA, which relieves 
internet service providers of any responsibility to police their websites for 
infringing content.  
A.  Congress Should Modify the DMCA to Explicitly Include Pre-1972 
Sound Recordings 
While the Second Circuit held that the DMCA’s safe harbor protections 
apply to pre-1972 sound recordings, other circuits and state courts have 
interpreted the statute differently.183  Clearly, congressional intent weighs 
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heavily on judges’ minds when they are forced to rule on this issue.184  To 
provide clarity to internet service providers, copyright holders, and state and 
federal judges—as well as to reduce the amount of costly litigation that will 
no doubt continue without universal clarification—Congress should amend 
the DMCA to explicitly include pre-1972 sound recordings. 
A federalized copyright system for pre-1972 sound recordings would 
benefit both copyright holders and internet service providers by reducing the 
amount of money spent on litigation.  Litigation costs are a threat to 
copyright holders and service providers alike, forcing some defendant 
service providers into bankruptcy even after prevailing on copyright 
infringement claims.185  Since a primary purpose of passing the DMCA was 
to protect the expansion and growth of the internet by protecting service 
providers from expensive copyright litigation,186 it seems obvious that 
amending the statute to specifically include pre-1972 sound recordings 
would serve that very purpose. 
B.  Congress Should Clarify the Red Flag Knowledge Standard 
Under section 512(c) of the DMCA, Congress provided two sets of 
knowledge that would disqualify a service provider from safe harbor 
protection.187  The Second Circuit has interpreted the first standard, actual 
knowledge, to mean that a service provider has information regarding a 
specific incident of copyright infringement occurring on its website.188  That 
actual knowledge requires action on the part of the internet service provider 
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or else its safe harbor protection may be denied by a court.189  Overall, this 
is a sound policy that balances the interests of the copyright holders and the 
internet service providers, but issues may arise from the time-delay between 
notice of infringement and takedown.  Other than possibly speeding up the 
process to make the notice and takedown process more seamless, the 
provision works and does not require any modification. 
On the other hand, the Second Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify 
the red flag knowledge standard in both Viacom and Capitol Records.  The 
Second Circuit’s explanation of the differences between red flag and actual 
knowledge is inadequate and confusing to anyone who does not have a law 
degree—and even then, the explanation is unclear.190  Furthermore, the 
Second Circuit held that willful blindness only constitutes knowledge when 
a service provider intentionally makes an effort to avoid knowledge of a 
specific incident of infringement.191  
There are two solutions to the problems that arise out of this lack of 
clarity.  The first is to simply get rid of the red flag knowledge standard.  This 
solution, however, is undesirable at best.  While this may achieve the goal of 
reducing litigation, it is unfair to the copyright holder and would further 
indemnify internet service providers.  The goal of the DMCA should be to 
balance the interests of both parties, not to benefit one side while over-
burdening the other.  
A second solution is to have Congress establish a better definition for 
what constitutes red flag knowledge.  With a clearer understanding of what 
constitutes “facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent,”192 any litigation would be about facts and not about the law itself.  
Congress should gather some of the leading internet service providers like 
YouTube and Vimeo, as well as representatives of content creators to create 
an objective test.  The parties should determine what constitutes red flag 
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knowledge by taking into consideration and balancing both sets of interests.  
If left to the courts, both parties may have to accept interpretations similar to 
the Second Circuit’s, which failed to provide clear guidelines to either party.   
Without a viable solution, legal battles will continue over red flag 
knowledge and willful blindness.  This potentially costs both parties millions 
of dollars and creates further animosity between the service providers and 
copyright holders.  In conclusion, Congress should obtain input from both 
sides of the issue and create an objective red flag knowledge test that 
balances the interests of all involved. 
C.  Congress Should Modify Section 512(m) of the DMCA and Require 
Service Providers to Implement Some Basic Technologies to Catch 
Potential Infringers. 
A third possible solution is for Congress to modify section 512(m) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  Section 512(m) frees service 
providers from the responsibility of policing their websites against 
potentially infringing content.193  At the time of the DMCA’s creation, this 
was a valid concept because Congress sought to remove restrictions that 
would inhibit the expansion of the internet.194  It would have been 
counterproductive to force companies to spend their resources on policing 
content as opposed to expanding their technological and internet 
capabilities.195  Without section 512(m), the financial burden of policing 
content would have bankrupted many small start-up companies and slowed 
the pace of internet expansion.   
While section 512(m) was paramount to internet expansion in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, it now provides internet service providers with a valid 
excuse to not engage in any preemptive measures to protect copyright 
holders.  Many companies, like YouTube and Vimeo, have both the capital 
and resources to create software programs that would be the first line of 
defense against infringing content.  Unless companies are developing such 
software for their own interests—for example, creating software to catch 
infringers in order to protect against costly copyright litigation—the DMCA 
does not require any proactivity.  In fact, section 512(m) discourages 
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proactive measures.196  The time has come for Congress to either modify 
section 512(m) and establish some baseline preemptive counter-
infringement measures for internet service providers to embrace, or 
completely remove section 512(m) from the DMCA.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The DMCA was passed in 1998 with the intention to protect small start-
up internet companies from expensive litigation resulting from claims of 
copyright infringement.197  That goal has been achieved and has helped pave 
the way for internet start-up companies—such as YouTube and Vimeo—to 
become very profitable.198  With the advancement of technology over the 
past two decades, the DMCA now goes too far to protect internet service 
providers and places huge burdens on copyright holders to enforce their 
rights.  There must be a balancing of both interests to keep internet service 
providers up and running and making technological advances while 
simultaneously protecting creative expression.  Accordingly, Congress 
should update the DMCA so that content creators are afforded the same level 
of protection as internet service providers. 
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